Ram Orzach

Title: Professor of Economics
Office: 323A Elliott Hall
Phone: (248) 370-4965
Email: [email protected]

Education:
Tel-Aviv University, Recanati Graduate School of BA, Ph.D. Operations Research

Biography:
Ram Orzach specializes in the area of asymmetric information and its’ influence on decision making. When private information is held by a decision maker and he has to choose an action that the market observes and responds to, it is considered a signaling game. Ram works on signaling games concerning advertising and entrepreneurship. When the private information is held by more than one decision maker, it is considered a multi-sender game. Ram works on a model in which incumbent firms are facing competition from potential entrants. Models in which the decision makers hold different information are called differential information. He uses these methods to understand the behavior of buyers and sellers in auctions. Recent work introduces these methods to Law and Economics. His work is published in the RAND Journal of Economics, Games & Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, Journal of Mathematical Economics, and the International Journal of Game Theory.

Teaching interests: 
Microeconomics, Industrial Organization, Game Theory, Auctions, Law & Economics

Research interests: 
Models of Incomplete Information in: Signaling Games, Auctions, Law & Economics

Journals and Articles:

Orzach, R. , Stano, M. Supersizing: The Illusion of a Bargain and the Right-to-Split. Other. 19

Hodge, T. , Orzach, R. , Silberman, J. (2023). Higher Education Decision on Covid-19 Vaccine Mandate. Applied Economics Letters. 30(7), 11

Orzach, R. , Stano, M. (2021). On the degree of distortions under second-degree price discrimination. Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design. 6101-112

Einy, E. , Mridu Goswami, M. , Haimanko, O. , Orzach, R. , Sela, A. (2017). Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information. International Journal of Game Theory. 46(1), 72-102

Einy, E. , Haimanko, O. , Orzach, R. , Sela, A. (2016). Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps. International Journal of Game Theory. 45(Special Issue: In honor of Abraham Neyman), 63-88

Malueg, D. A., Orzach, R. (2012). Equilibrium and Revenue in a Family of Common-Value First-Price Auctions with Differential Information. International Journal of Game Theory. 41(2), 219-254

Forges, F. , Orzach, R. (2011). Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions With Common Values. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 47(6), 760-767

Malueg, D. A., Orzach, R. (2009). Revenue Comparison in Common-Value Auctions: Two Examples. Economics Letters. 105(2), 177-180

Orzach, R. , Spurr, S. J.(2008). Lesser-Included Offenses. International Review of Law and Economics. 28(4), 239-45

Orzach, R. , Tauman, Y. (2005). Strategic Dropouts. Games and Economic Behavior. 1(50), 79-88

Einy, E. , Haimanko, O. , Orzach, R. , Sela, A. (2002). Dominance Solvability of Second-Price Auctions with Differential Information. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 37147-258

Orzach, R. , Overgaard, P. B., Yauman, Y. (2002). Modest Advertising Signals Strength. RAND Journal of Economics. 33340-358

Einy, E. , Haimanko, O. , Orzach, R. , Sela, A. (2001). Dominant Strategies, Superior Information and Winner's Curse in Second-Price. International Journal of Game Theory. 30(3), 405-419

Orzach, R. , Tauman, Y. (1996). Signalling Reversal. International Economic Review. 37453-464